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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of political instability in Latin America. In
a panel of 18 Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000, we find that democratic
countries experience less average instability in the region, indicating that the move to
increased democracy in the last couple decades may alleviate the persistent problem of
instability in the area. We also find that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization
are important determinants of instability. Countries with low levels of inequality also
suffer less instability on average, while ethnic diversity has a non-linear effect on
instability. Many macroeconomic variables commonly thought to bring about political
instability, such as inflation and high budget deficits, are not significantly correlated with
instability in our sample. Only openness to trade has a significant negative effect on
political instability. Only openness to trade has a significant negative effect on political
instability
*corresponding author
JEL Codes: O11, O38, O15, 054
Key Words: Political Instability, Democracy, Economic Development, Latin America,
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I. Introduction
Ranked as the third most unstable region in the world in the post-war era, political
instability has been a pervasive problem in Latin America. 1 In our sample of 18 Latin
American countries from 1971-2000, there were 20 coups d’etat, 451 political
assassinations, 217 riots, and 113 crises that threatened to bring down the sitting
government. 2 Only three Latin American countries were consistently democratic over
the thirty year period: Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela. 3 All of the rest of the
countries switched from a democracy to an autocracy (or vice versa) at least once. In
sum, political instability is a persistent and pernicious problem in the region. 4
Given the many studies that document the negative relationship between instability
and capital accumulation (Alesina & Perotti (1996); Alesina et.al. (1996)), it is likely that this
instability has hampered economic development in the region. In this paper, we seek to uncover
the factors behind this instability. In a

In this paper we analyze the determinants of political instability in a panel of 18
Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000. Not only is Latin America an interesting
region to study because of it’s unusually persistent problems with instability, but focusing
on a small sample helps us to avoid potential problems with pooling data from a large set
of very different countries. 5 We find three main interesting results: First, regime type is
a significant determinant of instability in the area. Countries with higher democracy
scores also have lower average political instability, which indicates that recent moves to
increased democracy in the region may bring about less instability in the future. This
result is tempered though by our finding that long lived democracies have a greater
chance of experiencing instability than equally long lived autocracies. Second, we find
that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are both important factors behind
1

instability. Countries with low (or high) levels of inequality have less average instability
than countries with average levels of inequality, and ethnic fractionalization has a nonlinear effect on political instability. Increases in ethnic fractionalization lower instability
until a certain level of diversity, at which point any increases in diversity are associated
with higher political instability. Third, we find that many of the macroeconomic
variables included in our estimation (including the level and standard deviation of
inflation and government budget deficit) are only weakly significant at best. Only lagged
values of trade openness and investment are helpful in explaining current political
instability.
Section II discusses why political instability is important to overall economic
development, while section III investigates the determinants of instability. Section IV
discusses the results of our estimation, and section V concludes with a brief discussion of
the policy implications of our findings.

II. Why Political Instability Is Important
Political instability hinders economic development through its effect on the
accumulation of physical and human capital. 6 Investments are often difficult to reverse,
which means that investors will postpone new capital projects until the policy
environment clarifies. 7 Pindyck & Solimano (1993) originally argued that economic
instability, in the form of high inflation, is more damaging to new investment, than
political instability. Since then, however, many other papers in the literature have found
political instability to be equally harmful. Collier (1999) shows that under extreme cases
of political instability, such as civil war, a country’s existing capital stock will suffer
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from both the physical destruction and the general neglect during wartime. Investors will
delay all new capital investments and either resort to purely speculative activities or
move their money abroad. 8
Most empirical studies of the effects of political instability investigate the
relationship between instability and economic growth. For instance, Alesina et.al.
(1996), in a sample of 113 countries from 1950 to 1982, analyze the joint determination
of political instability and per-capita GDP growth and find that instability has a negative
and significant effect on growth rates.
Several other papers specifically test the relationship between political instability
and investment rates or productivity. Barro (1991) finds that instability negatively affects
economic growth and investment and argues that property rights are not enforced in
politically unstable environments. Alesina & Perotti (1996) show that political instability
has a negative effect on investment in a sample of 70 countries from 1960 to 1985.
Venieris & Gupta (1983) confirm their results using a different sample of countries and
time period. Edwards (1998) and Berthélemy & Söderling (2001), however, both report
either statistically weaker or mixed empirical results. Edwards, in a panel of 93 countries
from 1960 to 1990, finds a negative, but relatively weak, relationship between instability
and productivity growth. Berthélemy & Söderling show that coups d’etat and revolutions
negatively and significantly affect investment rates in Sub-Sahara Africa, although the
finding is not robust to the inclusion of productivity measures. 9
Political instability can also depress the accumulation of human capital. Maloney
(2002) argues that endemic political instability in Latin America may have been one of
the major reasons why countries in the region have low levels of human capital.
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However, the empirical evidence that instability lowers human capital accumulation is
not definitive. In one of the few papers that test the relationship between the two,
Fedderke & Klitgaard (1998) distinguish between “regime-threatening” and “non-regime
threatening” political instability and find that only the former is negatively related to
education levels.
Besides a direct effect on the accumulation of physical and human capital,
political instability can have detrimental effects on the policymaking environment and
governance in general. Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2005) argue that “governments in
politically unstable and polarized countries are more likely to adopt inefficient or suboptimal policies, including the maintenance of inefficient tax systems, higher current
government consumption, or the accumulation of larger external debts, which, in turn,
adversely affect long-run economic growth.” Chief executives who are politically
vulnerable are less likely to undertake necessary, but unpopular, economic reforms.
Likewise, Kaufmann & Kraay (2002) argue that good governance has a positive
effect on per-capita income growth, and that one of the components of good governance
is low political instability. 10 The reason for instability’s inclusion in the definition of
governance is that “the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the
likelihood of wrenching changes in government, which not only has a direct effect on the
continuity of policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of all citizens to
peacefully select and replace those in power” (p. 177). They go on to argue that Latin
American countries have low levels of governance in comparison to other regions of the
world, and that the economic growth in the region has come without an improvement in
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governance. In the section below, we discuss our measure of political instability and
some of the factors which may help to explain the prevalence of instability in the region.

III. An Empirical Model of Political Instability
We construct a measure of political instability using data from the Cross National
Time Series Data (Banks (2005)). Because there are so many different types of
instability, we begin by creating three categories of instability: the first includes all
events which pose a major threat to the political and economic system at the national
level such as coups, revolutions, and government crises; the second consists of events
that reveal citizen discontent with the political system, such as general strikes, riots, and
anti-government demonstrations; and the third includes extreme violent actions either by
opposition elements or by the government in response to such opposition, such as guerilla
warfare, assassinations, and purges. 11 We then sum, by category, the number of unstable
events that occurred in each country over a 5 year period. As our three dimensions of
political instability are likely to be highly correlated, we then take the principal
component of these three categories as our measure of political instability. 12
Table 1 shows the average (and ranking) of our index of political instability for
the individual countries in our sample, where larger numbers are associated with greater
instability. Based on our measure of instability, the four most unstable countries are
Argentina, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Colombia while the four most stable are Panama,
Honduras, Paraguay, and Costa Rica. While the unstable group had at least twice as
many unstable events as the stable group in each individual measure of instability
(assassinations, coups, crises, demonstrations, guerilla action, purges, revolutions, riots,
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and strikes), the differential was especially great in the case of assassinations and
guerrilla warfare. The unstable group had a total of 231 assassinations during the sample
period and 62 instances of guerrilla warfare, while the stable group experienced a sum of
35 assassinations and 7 instances of guerrilla warfare. 13 Argentina and Guatemala each
experienced around 200 events of political instability from 1971-2000. Of those two
hundred events, 124 of them in Argentina revealed citizen discontent, while 125 of them
in Guatemala consisted of extreme violence.
While most empirical studies of political instability focus on the effects of
instability on investment or growth, several studies investigate the factors important
explaining political instability. In the paragraphs below, we discuss the variables most
emphasized in this literature. Table 3 provides a more detailed description of all the
variables used in the estimation and their sources, while Table 4 provides summary
statistics.

A. Democracy, Factionalism, and Regime Duration
Many studies highlight the importance of regime type to political stability.
Ellingsen (2000) and Parsa (2003) argue that democratic regimes tend to experience less
political instability than undemocratic regimes because they allow citizens to participate
in the political process. By allowing political participation, violence will be less likely to
arise in democratic regimes because conflict can be solved through voting and consensus
(Rummel (1995)). Auvinen (1997) and Przeworski & Limongi (1997) also point out that
democracies divert resources from investment to consumption, which allows democratic
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regimes to provide more economic and political goods, thus alleviating deprivation and
discontent.
Feng (1997), in a sample of 96 countries from 1960 to 1980, presents evidence of
a positive relationship between democracy and stability. More recently, although
Goldstone et.al. (2004) find that democracy is one of the most important factors behind
political stability around the world, they show that weak and factionalized democracies
are some of the most unstable types of regimes. In a study restricted to Latin American
countries, Schatzman (2005) finds mixed results for the relationship between democracy
and stability, depending on the measure of stability. Specifically, she finds that countries
with more democratic regimes are less likely to experience collective protests, but more
likely to experience rebellions.
To measure democracy, we construct five-year averages of POLITY2, a variable
obtained from the Polity IV Project. POLITY2 is equal to a country’s democracy score
less its autocracy score. Since the underlying variables range from 0 to 10, POLITY2 has
a range of -10 and 10, where higher values represent stronger democracy. We also
include two other regime measures. The first is a dummy variable that accounts for the
presence of factionalism, where factionalism is defined by the Polity IV dataset as
“polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for
political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to
the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.” 14 We take the average
factional score for each five year period as a measure of particularist politics.
The second is a measure of regime durability and it is measured the year before
each 5 year period. It is defined as the number of years that a country has not undergone
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a significant regime change, defined by the Polity IV as a 3 point move in a country’s
democracy score. Countries which have remained consistently democratic or autocratic
during the sample may be less likely to experience a drastic change in regime. We also
interact this with a democracy dummy which is equal to one when POLITY2 is greater
than 0. In this way, we can also determine if durability matters across regime types.

B. Neighborhood Instability
Political instability can be contagious since revolutionary groups and ideologies
can cross borders. Countries in “bad neighborhoods” might suffer from neighboring
instability, especially if that instability causes a flood of refugees into the country or if
guerilla armies use a country as a base from which to attack their home country.
Goldstone et.al. (2004) find that countries with four or more political unstable neighbors
are more likely to experience political instability, while Schatzman (2005) finds that
political instability in neighboring countries increases the probability of a country
experiencing collective protests. 15 We create a variable that is equal to the number of
neighbor countries that experienced political instability during each five-year period. We
follow Goldstone et.al.’s approach and consider a country as politically unstable if there
was either an ethnic conflict or a revolutionary war during the year, since these are the
types of instability that are most likely to affect neighboring countries. Figure 1
illustrates the “bad neighborhoods” in Latin America and shows that countries in trouble
tend to be clustered in the same region. There are two main blocs: the first is in Central
America and includes Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; the second is in
northwestern South America and includes Colombia and Peru.
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C. Inequality
Eckstein & Wickham-Crowley (2003) and Oxhorn (2003) provide evidence that
the increase in democracy in Latin America has come without an improvement in the
distribution of income, and that income disparity may be threatening stability in the
region. Inequality is considered a significant explanatory variable of political instability
because, at least in part, inequality in education, skill, income, and wealth creates an
uncertain environment where it is difficult to promote democracy, and low democracy
has been associated with high political instability (Tulchin & Brown (2002)). Acemoglu
& Robinson (2006) develop a theoretical model of democracy and income inequality and
argue that high income inequality in Latin America is one of the main causes of weak
democracy in the region. According to Acemoglu & Robinson (2006), the elite will be
against democracy in highly unequal societies because a democratic system will impose
more redistributive policies. In addition, Perotti (1996) and Auvinen & Nafziger (2002)
argue that an unequal distribution of income will produce social discontent, since
individuals will perceive that income is unfairly distributed, leading to manifestations and
uprisings. 16 Empirically, Alesina & Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), and Odedokun &
Round (2001) show that countries with high income inequality are more likely to be
politically unstable. 17
To determine the effect of income inequality on the political environment, we
create two dummy variables representing countries with high and low levels of income
inequality. To create these dummy variables, we first calculated the mean of the Gini
coefficient (from 1971 to 2000) for all the countries in the sample. 18 The high (low)
inequality dummy variable is equal to one for those countries that have an average Gini
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coefficient of one standard deviation above (below) the sample mean. As shown in Table
1, the most unequal countries in our sample are Guatemala, Peru, the Dominican
Republic, and Bolivia. The least unequal are Paraguay, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and
Nicaragua. 19 It is interesting to note that, except the Dominican Republic, all of the
highly unequal countries are also in the high instability sample. Likewise, two of the
most politically stable countries also have the least amount of income inequality (Costa
Rica and Paraguay).

D. Other socio-demographic conditions
Other variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, economic discrimination of
ethnic minorities, and urbanization growth are relevant determinants of political
instability. 20 Specifically, Annett (2000), Auvinen & Nafziger (2002), Collier & Hoeffler
(2004), and Ellingsen (2000) show that ethnic fractionalization has a positive and
significant effect on instability levels. Auvinen & Nafziger (2002), on the other hand,
argue that ethnic fractionalization is not a sufficient condition for political instability
since ethnic antagonism does not necessarily exists in highly fractionalized societies. 21
Auvinen & Nafziger (2002), Ellingsen (2000), and Goldstone et.al. (2005) claim that
economic discrimination of ethnic minorities is what leads to political instability because
those groups that are discriminated against will rebel against the system.
While urbanization growth has also been considered in explanation of political
instability, there is no consensus on how urbanization rates affect political instability.
For example, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) argue that the rate of urbanization is low during
periods of instability, and that this negative relationship is due to the fact that a
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government has better military capability in a highly urbanized country than in a less
urbanized country. With low urbanization rates, the population is dispersed and it is
difficult for the government to contain instability. On the other hand, Auvinen (1997)
and Annett (2000) argue that urbanization tends to promote more political instability.
High urbanization rates promote more instability because it is difficult for the
government to provide basic services in highly populated cities, which creates popular
discontent.
To investigate the effect of these socio-economic factors on instability, we include the
number of years of the five year period in which there is at least one group that
experiences economic discrimination, ethnic fractionalization (and its square), and the
average urbanization growth rate for each five-year period. 22

D. Macroeconomic factors
While the majority of papers on political instability investigate the effects of
instability on growth or investment, several models study the possibility that economic
variables help explain instability. Poor economic performance has been considered as a
major cause of political instability for two reasons. First, when income is low (or
falling), the opportunity cost for an individual to rise up, protest, or revolt is low (Collier
& Hoeffler (2004)). Individuals have an incentive to quit their participation in productive
activities and take part in protests and insurrections (Grossman (1991)). Second, poor
economic conditions increase deprivation, which will fuel political instability as citizens
perceive their government to be incompetent (Auvinen & Nafziger (1999), Ellingsen
(2000), and Posner (1997)). Goldstone et.al. (2005) use infant mortality as a measure of
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the standard of living and find that this variable is one of the best overall predictors of
political instability around the world. 23 In addition, Cuzan et.al. (1988), Annett (2000),
and Blomberg & Hess (2002) and Booth (1991) show that low income growth has a
positive effect on instability. 24
Many papers study the effect of political instability on inflation rates, but less
have investigated the possibility that high (or volatile) inflation may destabilize polities.
Cukierman et.al. (1992) find in a sample of 79 countries that politically weak
governments are more likely to resort to seignorage. Paldam (1987) focuses on eight
Latin American countries from 1946-83 and shows that the causality between inflation
and instability work both ways. He goes on to demonstrate that almost no regime in the
region has survived a bout of hyperinflation, a trend that still holds in the region. Of the
countries with the highest and most volatile inflations, almost all were forced out of
power (either by a coup d’etat or by the military leaving in disgrace, as was the case of
Argentina in the early 1980s and Brazil in the mid-1980s).
Besides inflation itself, government spending may be a stabilizing or destabilizing
factor, depending on how the spending is financed. Annett (2000) finds that an increase
in government spending is associated with lower levels of political instability, while
Cuzan et.al. (1988) find that an increase in government spending increases political
instability in Latin American countries.
Lastly, Goldstone et.al. (2005) and Donovan et.al. (2005) discuss the possibility
that trade openness might have on political instability. Goldstone et.al. note that
“countries with lower trade openness (at the 25th percentile in the global distribution) had
roughly two to three times higher odds of near-term instability than countries with higher
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openness to trade (those at the 75th percentile).” Donovan et.al. argue that trade openness
may be negatively associated with instability if openness brings about more economic
growth. They also note that openness increases a country’s contact with outsiders, which
may stimulate productivity growth and improve domestic institutions.
To investigate the effects of macroeconomic variables on instability in the region,
we include the share of investment as a percentage of GDP, the standard deviation of
inflation (as a measure of inflation volatility), the share of the government budget deficit
as a percentage of GDP, and openness to trade. 25 All of these variables are constructed
in five-year averages. However, since there may be a reverse causality issue between
them and political instability, we use the first lag in each case.

IV. Results
In this section, we test in a panel of 18 Latin American countries whether the
variables discussed above significantly influence political instability. We use Ordinary
Least Squares and White robust standard errors for all estimations. Unless otherwise
noted, all of the data is averaged into 5 year periods, allowing us to capture information
from both average cross country differences and fluctuations over time. 26
Column 1 of Table 5 presents our results and shows that the model explains 46
percent of the variation in the instability index. One of the most interesting results from
column 1 is that the regime type and durability significantly affect instability levels in the
region. The coefficient on POLITY2 is negative and significant at the .01 level, meaning
that countries with higher levels of democracy in the five-year period have lower levels
of instability on average. The quantitative effect of democracy is not quantitatively large;
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a one standard deviation increase in POLITY2 (equal to 6.09) is associated with a .36
point decrease in the political instability index (which is equal to almost one-third of a
standard deviation).
The coefficient on the factional dummy is positive and significant at the 1 percent
level, supporting Goldstone et.al.’s (2005) findings that factionalized political regimes
are also more unstable on average. The quantitative effect of factionalism on instability
is slightly larger than the effect of the POLITY2 variable, but it is still small. A one
standard deviation increase in factionalism (equal to .36) is associated with a .44 point
increase in the political instability index.
To determine the effect of regime durability on political instability, we also want
to control for the possibility that different regime types may have different effects on
political instability. For this reason, we include in our model an interaction term of the
duration of a regime and a dummy equal to one for democratic countries. 27 We find that
the coefficient on durability is negative and weakly significant, but that the interaction
term is positive and significant at the .01 level. These results imply that new autocratic
regimes are more likely to face political instability in the subsequent five-year period
than more established ones.
Somewhat surprisingly, the results also indicate that older democracies also face
higher instability levels than equally established autocracies. One possible reason for this
finding is the fact that individuals in a democratic regime have more opportunity to
express their discontent through non-violent demonstrations. Since our index of political
instability includes demonstrations and strikes, our finding supports the view that under
democracies the dynamic between the government and society may be different. 28
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Unlike the results in Goldstone et.al. (2005) and Schatzman (2005), we find no
evidence of regional contagion in the region.

We also find no significant correlation

between economic discrimination of minorities and instability. We do show, however,
that overall ethnic diversity does matter for instability. Column 1 shows that the ethnic
fractionalization index has a significant negative effect on instability at the 10 percent
level, while the square of this index has a significant positive effect on political instability
at the 1 percent level. Figure 2 graphs the non-linear relationship between ethnic
diversity and instability that we find. Increases in diversity lower instability until the
fractionalization index reaches .33, at which point any further ethnic diversity increases
average instability levels. The range of diversity in Latin America is from about .17
(Paraguay) to .74 (Bolivia). Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras,
Paraguay, and Uruguay all have diversity rankings to the left of the turning point, while
the rest of the sample have diversity levels associated with higher levels of instability.
Income inequality also has an important affect on instability levels in the region.
The coefficients on the high and low inequality dummies are statistically negative and
significant at the .01 level. Countries with low income inequality have an average of 1.07
points less on our index of political instability than countries with medium levels of
inequality. Thus, the effect of low inequality is both statistically and quantitatively
important (1.07 is close to one standard deviation in the instability index), supporting
Alesina & Perotti’s (1996) finding. Nonetheless, our estimation shows that countries
with high income inequality have an index of political instability below 0.54 points than
countries with medium levels of income inequality. This finding supports Acemoglu &

15

Robinson’s (2006) model of the relationship by showing that the effect of income
inequality on political instability is not a linear function of the Gini coefficient.
Of the different macroeconomic variables discussed in the previous section, only
trade openness is consistently significant. Neither the level nor the standard deviation of
inflation are statistically significant (we report only the results of using the standard
deviation for reasons of space), nor is government deficit share. Investment as a
percentage of GDP is negative and significant at the .10 level, meaning that countries
which invested more in the previous five-year period have less instability in the current
period. Trade openness is positive and significant at the .01 level, indicating that an
increase in openness by one standard deviation in the previous five-year period is
associated with a .35 point decrease in the instability index. This result supports
Goldstone et.al.’s (2005) finding that trade openness was negatively related to instability
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Lastly, the results in column 1 show that urbanization growth rate is negative and
significant at the .01 level. This finding is especially interesting since there are two
contrasting views in the literature on urbanization and instability. Our finding provides
support for the argument that urbanization can helped to promote political stability
(Collier’s & Hoeffler (2004)). Specifically, we find that one standard deviation increase
in the urbanization growth rate (equal to 3.243) is associated with a drop in the political
instability index of .42 points.
For robustness purposes, we re-estimate the model and exclude the variables that
are not significant at least at the 10 percent level (neighborhood conflict, economic
discrimination, the standard deviation of inflation, and the government deficit share). We
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perform an F test and find that we cannot reject (at the 5 percent level) the hypothesis that
these variables as a group do not explain significantly political instability. Column 3 of
Table 5 shows the results from this estimation. The results are almost identical to that of
column 1, with the exceptions that the coefficient on ethnic fractionalization is now
significant at the .05 level instead of the .10 level and the coefficient of the interaction
term between the regime durability variable and the democracy dummy is now significant
at the .05 level instead of the .01 level.
In addition, we re-estimate our model using a different measure of democracy.
Here we measure democracy as the five year average of the democracy score (DEMOC)
provided by the Polity IV dataset. The variable ranges from 0 to 10 and it measures the
degree of openness of political institutions. 29 Like the POLITY2 variable, higher values
of DEMOC are associated with higher levels of democracy. Using this new measure of
democracy, column 2 of Table 5 shows the estimates of the full model. Column 4 of
Table 5 shows the estimates of the restricted model that excludes those variables that are
not significant as group based on the F test.
The results are very similar to the previous results. For example, the coefficient
on democracy is negative and statistically significant at the .01 level. The coefficient on
the democracy score indicates that an increase on democracy of one standard deviation
(equal to 3.56) is associated with a .39 point decrease in the political instability index,
which is very close to the estimate when we use the polity score (POLITY2) as a measure
of democracy. Although results obtained from this estimation are very similar to
previous results, there are some slight differences. The coefficient on factionalism
becomes is now significant at .05 level instead of .01 level, ethnic fractionalization
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becomes significant at the .05 level instead of .10 level, and the investment share is now
insignificantly different from zero. 30

V. Discussion
In this paper, we investigate the main factors behind political instability in 18
Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000. We estimate a model of instability for the
region, including variables such as regime type and durability, income inequality, ethnic
diversity, ethnic discrimination, regional spillover effects, urbanization growth, and a
host of macroeconomic variables. We find many interesting results.
First, we show that democracy and factionalism have a significant effect on
political instability. Countries with strong democratic regimes suffer less political
instability on average, while countries with factional regimes experience higher average
political instability. In addition, we show that regime durability has a negative effect on
instability, although long lived democracies are more vulnerable than long lived
autocracies. These findings are important because they highlight the need to establish the
institutions and policies to promote strong democracies in Latin American countries, and
also the possibility of future research on regime durability and democracy in the region.
We also find that the low income inequality dummy has a significant negative
effect on political instability, meaning that policies which promote a more equal
distribution of income may have a side benefit of lowering overall political instability.
For instance, while the promotion of a more egalitarian society through taxation may not
be feasible (or popular) in the region, policy-makers could promote income equality
through education. Our estimates show that ethnic fractionalization is partly behind high
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political instability in Latin America, and that highly fractionalized countries will tend to
experience more political instability. This highlights the importance of establishing
institutions that incorporate individuals from diverse ethnic groups in the political process
with the purpose to promote more stability.
The demographic composition of a country is also important, since more
urbanization seems to be associated with lower levels of political instability. Policies
related to urbanizing and incorporating rural regions into to the national economy can
also be used to promote stability in the region. Lastly, while many of the
macroeconomic variables were insignificantly related to instability, we show that
openness to trade is negatively and significantly associated with political instability.
Although Latin American countries have already significantly decreased their barriers to
international trade, these results suggest that further trade liberalization will promote
more political stability in the region.
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Table 1
Political Instability, Democracy, and Income Inequality Averages (1971 – 2000)

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dom. Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

Political
Instability
2.270
1.535
0.477
1.343
1.630
-0.278
0.333
0.811
1.469
1.941
0.471
1.059
0.856
0.365
0.016
1.766
0.294
0.436

PI
Ranking
1
5
11
7
4
18
15
10
6
2
12
8
9
14
17
3
16
13

# of
Events
218
136
81
155
168
16
72
86
154
195
72
119
94
58
36
157
58
65

PI Events
Ranking
1
7
11
5
3
18
12
10
6
2
13
8
9
15
17
4
16
14

Polity 2
Score
2.433
3.233
1.900
0.267
7.833
10.000
4.167
5.167
3.167
0.667
3.633
-1.033
-0.233
-0.467
-2.533
1.433
2.233
8.633

Polity2
Ranking
9
7
11
14
3
1
5
4
8
13
6
17
15
16
18
12
10
2

Gini
Coeff.
43.954
47.489
47.024
45.491
44.152
41.285
47.505
45.050
45.013
48.933
45.796
42.930
41.942
46.729
40.109
48.158
41.751
43.919

Gini
Ranking
12
4
5
8
11
17
3
9
10
1
7
14
15
6
18
2
16
13
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Table 2
Description of the Components of Instability
Variable
Coup d’etat

Defined by the Cross-National Time Series Data Archive As:
“The number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top
government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power structure
in a given year. The term ‘coup’ includes, but is not exhausted by, the
term ‘successful revolution’. Unsuccessful coups are not counted.”

Assassination

“Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high
government official or politician.”

General Strike

“Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves
more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies
or authority.”

Guerrilla Warfare

“Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent
bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the
present regime.”

Government Crisis

“Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of
the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such
overthrow.”

Purge

“Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition
within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.”

Riot

“Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving
the use of physical force.”

Revolution

“Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt
at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose
aim is independence from the central government.”

Anti-Government
Demonstration

“Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies
or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.”
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Table 3
Description of the Independent Variables
Variable
Democracy

Description
Combined polity score (POLITY2) computed by subtracting the
autocracy score from the democracy score. Source: Polity IV Project.

Democracy (alternative measure) Democracy score (DEMOC) measures the general openness of
political institutions. Source: Polity IV Project.
Economic discrimination

Number of years in the 5 year period that a country has had state-led
economic discrimination against at least one group, measured as a 4 on
the economic discrimination index. Source: Minority at Risk Dataset.

Ethnic fractionalization

Ethnic fractionalization index. Source: Alesina et.al. (2003) Dataset.

Factionalism

Political competition score (POLCOMP) that combines the regulation
and competitiveness of participation scores. Source: Polity IV Project.

Government budget deficit as a
share of GDP

The percentage of government budget in nominal prices (government
expenditure minus government revenue). Source: OXLAD.

Inequality dummies

High (low) inequality dummy equal to 1 if a country has an average
Gini coefficient one standard deviation above (below) the world mean.
Source: University of Texas Inequality Project.

Inflation

The level and standard deviation of inflation in the 5 year period.
Inflation calculated using the GDP deflator. Source: World Bank
Development Indicators.

Investment share of GDP

The percentage of GDP that comes from investment. Source: Penn
World Tables 6.2.

Neighborhood conflict

Number of neighbor countries that experienced either an ethnic
conflict or a revolutionary war. Source: Political Instability Task
Force Dataset.

Regime durability

Number of years a country has had a particular regime (DURABLE).
Source: Polity IV Dataset.

Trade Openness

Openness is equal to exports plus imports divided by real GDP
(Laspeyres method). Source: Penn World Tables 6.2.

Urban population growth

Growth of the percentage of the total population that live in urban
areas. Source: Oxford Latin American Economic History Database
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Table 4
Summary Statistics

Democracy (POLITY2)
Democracy (DEMOC)
Economic discrimination
Ethnic discrimination
Ethnic discrimination2
Factionalism
Government deficit share
High inequality
Standard Deviation of Inflation
Investment share
Low inequality
Neighborhood conflict
Openness
Political instability
Regime durability
Regime durability* Democracy
Urbanization growth
All variables have 108 observations

Mean
2.806
4.955
1.509
0.427
0.217
0.204
-0.299
0.222
195.825
14.911
0.222
0.667
48.005
0.933
12.685
8.241
5.013

Median
5.800
6.000
0.000
0.491
0.241
0.000
-0.014
0.000
8.593
14.556
0.000
1.000
39.282
0.596
6.500
1.000
4.124

Std. Dev.
6.087
3.537
2.177
0.187
0.159
0.360
2.838
0.418
808.505
5.407
0.418
0.749
35.707
1.202
16.133
15.378
3.243
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Table 5
Dependent Variable: Political instability
1
3.23
(5.91)
-0.06a
(5.34)
1.23a
(2.53)
-0.01c
(1.83)
0.02a
(2.65)
0.05
(0.41)
-1.07a
(3.19)
-0.54a
(3.46)
0.02
(0.88)
-4.97c
(1.87)

2
3.63
(6.81)
-0.11a
(3.95)
1.15b
(2.40)
-0.01c
(1.88)
0.02a
(2.75)
0.03
(0.25)
-1.01a
(3.09)
-0.56a
(3.66)
0.03
(0.99)
-5.49b
(1.99)

7.67a
(2.93)
-0.13a
(5.58)
0.0001
(1.61)

Investment share t-1
Government deficit share t-1

Constant
Democracy*
Factionalism
Regime durability
Regime durability * democracy
Neighborhood conflict
Low inequality dummy
High inequality dummy
Economic Discrimination
Ethnic Fractionalization
Ethnic Fractionalization2
Urbanization
Standard Deviation of Inflation

Trade Openness t-1
R-squared
Observations

3
3.40
(5.77)
-0.06a
(8.30)
1.30a
(2.94)
-0.01c
(1.74)
0.02b
(2.04)
**

4
3.76
(6.08)
-0.10a
(6.27)
1.22a
(2.79)
-0.01a
(2.52)
0.02a
(2.63)
**

-1.15a
(3.96)
-0.55a
(3.35)
**

-1.08a
(3.87)
-0.55a
(3.41)
**

-5.23b
(2.22)

-5.61b
(2.24)

8.34a
(3.04)
-0.13a
(5.61)
0.0001
(1.43)

8.06a
(3.55)
-0.13a
(5.94)
**

8.52a
(3.51)
-0.13a
(5.99)
**

-0.05c
(1.71)

-0.05
(1.63)

-0.05c
(1.73)

-0.05
(1.63)

0.02
(0.93)
-0.01a
(2.92)
0.465
108

0.02
(1.07)
-0.01a
(2.89)
0.466
108

**

**

-0.01a
(2.66)
0.454
108

-0.01a
(2.89)
0.456
108

t-statistics in parentheses use White’s robust standard errors. a, b, and c represent statistical significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent level, respectively. *Democracy is measured with the POLITY2 variable in columns 1 & 3 and with
the DEMOC variable in columns 2 &4.
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Figure 1
Bad Neighborhoods in Latin America (1971-2000)

Source: www.ftaaconsulting.com/images/map.gif

*Bad neighborhoods in red (modification)
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Figure 2
The Effect of Ethnic Diversity on Political Instability
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Notes
1

The statistic is from Goldstone et.al. (2005).

2

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.

3

Our measure here of democracy is any country with an average POLITY2 score above zero for
the 6 five-year periods in our panel. See Table 3 for a definition of the POLITY2 measure.
4

Even though the majority of Latin American countries undertook democratic reforms in the
1980s and 90s that promoted stability, Foran (2005) and Wickham-Crowley (2001) argue that the
region will continue to experience political instability in the future.
5

Grier & Tullock (1989) demonstrate the importance of testing the validity of pooling data from
large samples of countries together in a single growth equation. They show that the coefficients
in the growth equation are significantly different across different sub-samples and cannot be
appropriate pooled. Block’s (2001) work also provides evidence on the idea that critical slope
terms are different for different sub-samples.

6

For the effects of instability on economic development, see Hibbs (1973), Benhabib & Spiegel
(1997), Benhabib & Rustichini (1996), Edwards (1996), Gyimah-Brempong & Traynor (1996)
and Alesina & Perotti (1996).

7

See McDonald & Siegel (1986), Majd & Pindyck (1987), Bernanke (1983) and Cukierman
(1980), and Stewart & Venieris (1985).

8

De Melo et.al. (1996) and Knight et.al. (1996) both confirm the damaging effect civil war has
on a country’s capital stock.
9

It has been argued that the direction of causality could run the other direction, where low growth
rates make political instability more likely. Campos & Nugent (2003) use a Granger causality
test to determine the direction of causality between political instability and investment. They find
in a sample of developing countries that the causality goes from political instability to capital
accumulation and not vice versa. Londregan & Poole (1990), on the other hand, find no evidence
of a relationship between political instability and investment.

10

Political instability is considered by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) as one of the dimensions of
governance, and they define governance as "the traditions and institutions by which the authority
is exercised, the process by which governments are elected and monitored, and the capacity of the
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies" (p.176).
11

See Table 2 for a detailed definition of all of these variables.

12

The first principal component explains 55.9% of the variance of instability, while the
first and second components cumulatively explain 81.2% of the variance. Since the first
component explains more than half of the variation in the series, we use it as our measure
of political instability. Since we want to have a measure of political instability and not a
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measure of political stability, our measure of political instability is equal to one minus the
principal component of these three variables.
13

There were 8 coups d’etat, 41 government crises, 142 anti-government demonstrations, 16
purges, 53 revolutions, 70 riots, and 94 general strikes in the unstable group. The numbers in the
4 most stable countries were 4 coups d’etat, 12 government crises, 71 anti-government
demonstrations, 3 purges, 11 revolutions, 13 riots, and 26 general strikes.
14

According to the Polity IV, factional regimes also must have the following electoral
participation characteristics: “There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which
compete for political influence at the national level–parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not
necessarily elected–but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.”
15

On the other hand, she finds that regional instability decreases the probability of rebellions in
the domestic country.
16

Likewise, Parsa (2003), Eckstein & Wickham-Crawley (2003), and Oxhorn (2003) argue that
high income inequality in Latin America promotes political instability in the region.

17

However, in a sample restricted to Sub-Saharan countries, Nel (2003) finds that income
inequality has a significant effect on investors’ perceptions about the political environment but
not a significant effect on political instability.
18

We use the Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII) measure created by Galbraith &
Kum (2004) and provided by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP).
19

The remaining 10 countries are those with levels of income inequality in the medium range,
and we consider those as the control group in our analysis.
20

Alesina & Perotti (1996) also use primary school enrollment rates as an explanatory variable of
political instability and find that education has a significant negative effect on political instability.
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) use the male secondary enrollment rate as an explanatory variable,
arguing that the variable reflects the opportunity cost of rebellion. We do not include education
in our specification because we found no significant relationship between it and political
instability in any of our estimations.
21

Easterly & Levine (1997) also use ethnic fractionalization as an explanatory variable of
political instability but find that it is not significant.
22

It is possible that the effect of fractionalization is non-linear, where highly homogenous
societies and highly diverse ones are both associated with more stability.
23

We do not include infant mortality as an explanatory variable in our model because we found
that it has no significant effect for the Latin American countries.
24

Investment rates are also thought to be important to political stability. For instance,
investment and instability are simultaneously determined in Alesina & Perotti’s (1996) model. In
our estimation we do not include the real GDP growth because we find that it is not statistically
significant.
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25

The investment share and openness to trade variables were obtained from the Penn World
Tables 6.2. The government deficit was estimated using data provided by the Oxford Latin
American Economic History Database (OXLAD). See Table 2 for an explanation of how
government deficit as share of GDP was constructed.
26

See Grier & Tullock (1989) for a justification of using 5 year intervals instead of averaging
over long periods.

27

Countries are considered as democracies if they have an average POLITY2 score greater than
zero.

28

This result suggests further study on how the dynamics between government and society have
evolved in democratic regimes in Latin America.
29

For this variable, observations with codes -88 and -77 were eliminated since they indicate a
transition period or a period in which there is a collapse of central political authority. Few
observations had these codes and the 5 year averages were constructed with the remaining
observations.
30

Although investment share becomes insignificant, an F test shows that this variable should not
be eliminated from the estimation of the restricted model.
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